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INTRODUCTION 
While terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon,2 there has been a 
worldwide increase in the amount of attention paid by the media, 
governments and academics to this type of behavior for the last two 
decades.3 This increased interest has lead to an increasing number of 
studies of political terrorism in advanced industrialized democracies. 
Very few studies, however, analyze political terrorism in Canada. 
Undoubtedly, Canada has had a limited experience with terrorism com-
pared to other forms of political conflict.4 The majority of studies that 
do focus on Canada suffer from a multitude of problems. These studies, 
like those of the subject as a whole, are for the most part descriptive, 
atheoretical, and devoid of empirical analyses. The very few empirical 
analyses of terrorism5 generally focus on either international or transna-
tional terrorist events while other types of terrorism, for example, in-
terstate, state, and domestic, have been seriously underrepresented. 
Moreover, these studies have a number of methodological problems. 
While there are a variety of methodologies for studying terrorism6 
the most popular is the events data approach. While the reliability and 
validity of events or conflict data in general has been criticized,7 a data 
set on political terrorism has definite advantages. From a statistical 
analysis of terrorist incidents researchers should be able to: 
a) show that terrorists choose among a certain range of options; 
b) determine the physical, temporal and terrorist imposed boun-
daries within which terrorists act; 
c) delimit the range of choices open to the terrorists at any par-
ticular point in time; 
d) attach a statistical probability to these choices; 
e) predict the terrorists' most likely actions; 
f) compare terrorists' stated rationale for their actions to their 
target selection; 
g) develop appropriate counter-measures to be taken by policy-
makers, national security agencies, etc.; 
h) prevent panic and overreaction to terrorist events; 
i) allow for comparison with rates and trends in other countries to 
test theories of political performance; 
j) compare terrorist compaigns; 
k) undertake a comprehensive modelling effort that includes 
multivariate, time series, and process analysis; and, 
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1) carry out simulation studies. 
Consequently the author, in his efforts to create a data set on Cana-
dian terrorist events that is more detailed, rigorous and comprehensive 
than other compilations, reviews the conceptual and methodological pro-
blems with studying terrorism both in general and in Canada. In sum-
mary, this project is a step in the direction of more reliable data, inter-
pretation, and analysis of the pattern and trends of terrorism in Canada. 
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS 
Introduction 
The study of political terrorism regardless of the level of analysis 
(country, organization, or individual) is fraught with many conceptual 
problems. A clear understanding of these problems should help in con-
ducting sound methodological research. Two areas are relevant to this 
paper: the problems with studying terrorism in general and the problems 
with studying terrorism in Canada. 
Problems with Studying Political Terrorism 
Defining Terrorism 
Some conceptual questions about the nature of terrorism must be 
resolved before proceeding. A considerable debate exists about the pro-
per definition of terrorism.8 After an exhaustive analysis of over 100 ex-
pert definitions, Schmid concludes that there is no "true or correct 
definition."9 Nevertheless he outlines twenty-two elements of definitions 
and ostensibly develops a consensus definition consisting of five parts 
which this author accepts with one modification. First, terrorism is a 
method of combat in which random or symbolic victims are targets of 
violence. Second, through previous use of violence or the credible threat 
of violence, other members of that group or class are put in a state of 
chronic fear. Third, the victimization of the target is considered extra-
normal by most observers, which, fourth, creates an audience beyond the 
target of terror. Fifth, the purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize 
the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or com-
pliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands, for example, 
government, or targets of attention, for example, public opinion.10 This 
definition encompasses terrorism by governments, by oppositions, and 
by international movements. While Schmid's definition is certainly an 
improvement on most definitions, it is a little narrow neglecting, as it 
does, nonhuman terroristic victimization (for example, destruction of 
property and sabotage). While Schmid "concedes that some violence 
against symbolic things can be considered terroristic," he sees this "as an 
exception to the rule and therefore it need not [be] included." Just 
because it is an exception does not mean it is insignificant. Therefore I 
would contend that terrorism includes nonhuman targets. 
Typologies of Terrorism 
Regardless of the definitional problems with the concept of ter-
rorism, the study of terrorism can be further complicated by delineating 
the different types. Like the definition of terrorism itself, several 
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typologies have been introduced in the academic literature to classify dif-
ferent terrorist actions." One of the most popular and useful ways to 
classify terrorist events is the typology developed by Mickolus, accepted 
for the purpose of this paper. He distinguishes four types of political ter-
rorism based on whether an event involves government control or direc-
tion and direct involvement of nationals of more than one state. 
Mickolus thus identifies interstate, international, state, and domestic,12 
as types of terrorism. 
First, interstate terrorism, also known as state-sponsored terrorism 
or surrogate warfare, is carried out by individuals or groups controlled 
by a state, involving nationals of more than one country. An example of 
this type of terrorism occurred when the U.S. government sent Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed Green Berets into Cambodia to 
assassinate political officials. Second, international terrorism is carried 
out by autonomous non-state actors, affecting nationals of at least two 
states. This type of terrorism would include, for example, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) assassination of the Israeli ambassador 
in Paris." Third, state terrorism is confined to terrorist actions con-
ducted by a government within its national borders. This type of ter-
rorism includes the death squads which have operated in El Salvador and 
Brazil. Finally, domestic terrorism is carried on by autonomous non-
state actors, in their country of origin, against domestic targets. An ex-
ample of this is the activities of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA) in Northern Ireland. None of these types, however, are mutually 
exclusive in practice. Terrorist groups operating in a country may take 
part in both domestic and international terrorism, as, for example, in the 
FLQ kidnapping of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in 
Montreal. All types of terrorism identified by Mickolus have occurred in 
Canada: state,'4 international,15 interstate,16 and domestic.17 
Atheoretical Studies 
The majority of research on terrorism, however, have tended to be 
descriptive, uncomparative, normative, and marked by theoretical 
generalizations without any basis in empirical data.18 This is largely a 
result of the multitude of popular treatments which focus on case studies 
of particular incidents, groups or terrorists, leading a number of scholars 
to suggest that the state of theory development in the field of political 
terrorism is poor or as bad as other areas of social science research.19 
Paucity of Empirical Studies 
With a few exceptions there is also a lack of good empirically-
grounded research on terrorism.20 The term "empirical research" implies 
the use of the methodologies of the social sciences. Methodologies in 
conflict analysis, in particular, are: 
techniques for ordering information systematically and 
drawing inferences from that information about the 
patterns, trends, causes, processes and outcomes of con-
flict. Since political terrorism is a type of conflict, the 
full spectrum of techniques for conflict analysis are 
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potentially applicable to it. Methodologies does not 
mean simply the analysis of quantitative data, although 
the most technically-sophisticated methods are those 
designed to generate and analyze quantified informa-
tion. The term also encompasses systematic case studies, 
that is case studies guided by an explicit theoretical 
argument or framework.21 
Having arrived at a working definition of political terrorism, outlin-
ed the different types of terrorism, and examined two major problems 
with research in this area one must examine the problems with studying 
political terrorism in Canada. 
The Problems with Studying Political Terrorism in Canada 
There are three major problems with studying political terrorism in 
Canada, some of which mirror the problems of studying terrorism in 
general and some of which are specific to this country. These problems 
include: the difficulty with studying political violence22 in Canada; the 
lack of rigorous analysis; reliance on atheoretical case studies; and a 
paucity of empirical analyses. 
The Problems with Studying Political Violence in Canada 
The problems with studying political violence in Canada are occa-
sionally lamented by Canadian scholars.23 Specifically, the difficulties 
are largely a result of the lack of scholarly attention paid to terrorism and 
the resultant inadequate data base. 
Lack of scholarly attention 
While certain acts of political violence have profoundly affected the 
Canadian political process from time to time,24 the subject of political 
violence in Canada has generally been characterized by an equally pro-
found lack of scholarly research. Several reasons may account for this 
phenomenon. Among the more popular have been the myth of the 
"peaceable kingdom," the nature of Canada's political culture, and 
Canadians' tendency to be deferential to authority. 
There are a variety of versions of the so-called "myth of the 
peaceable kingdom."25 The assumption that underlies this myth is that 
Canadians have traditionally been, and remain, a thoroughly non-violent 
people in five areas: history, culture, economics, government, and free 
press. First, Canadian history has been relatively free from episodes of 
insurrection, revolution and domestic violence. Second, Canada's 
cultural composition has emphasized order, peace, and non-violence. It 
is an egalitarian society without major differences or hostilities along 
class or cultural lines, with a healthy respect for institutions, civil rights, 
and the rule of law. Third, Canada has been a wealthy country without 
the major pockets of poverty or the major obvious divisions that lead to 
internal strife. Fourth, the government has been stable with institu-
tionalized and active opposition as a mechanism for expressing dissent. 
Finally, the free press provides an instrument of dissent and also can be 
an instrument to promote social change and the resolution of social and 
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economic irritants." Numerous examples, however, can be found in Cana-
dian history to counter these propositions. 
Second is the argument that the Canadian political culture is generally 
less violent than those of most other Western nations. Canada has been 
perceived as a more conservative or traditional country culturally, especial-
ly compared to the United States. According to Lipset, the most important 
reason why Canadian culture is more conservative and traditional is that 
Canada emerged out of a successful "counter-revolution" while the 
United States represented the outcome of a successful revolution.27 Cana-
dians have also felt it necessary to differentiate themselves from 
Americans; they are more influenced by monarchical institutions, by a 
dominant Anglican religious tradition and a less individualistic and more 
generally controlled frontier expansion than was present in the American 
west. 
Third, Canadians on the whole are believed to be more differential to 
authority than many other Western nationalities.28 According to Naegele, 
there is a greater acceptance of limitations and of hierarchical patterns in 
Canada.2' Moreover, Canadians use "lawful" and traditionally institu-
tionalized means for altering regulations which they feel are wrong, 
whereas Americans are more disposed to use informal and often extra-
legal means to correct what they perceive is wrong.30 Furthermore, Cana-
dians on the whole are more obedient towards the law." For example, tak-
ing the difference in population into account, Canada has had a lower 
crime rate than the United States for violent offenses.32 Similarly, Cana-
dians have a greater respect for police than Americans.33 While the 
"peaceable kingdom," argument can be dismissed, the counter-
revolution, and deference to authority arguments may be more relevant in 
explaining why violence in Canada has been ignored in the scholarly 
research. 
Inadequate data base 
Another major impediment to our understanding of contemporary 
political conflict in Canada is the lack of adequate empirical data.34 
Though several comparative studies have generated conflict data for 
Canada,35 most cross-national data sets on conflict, however, generally 
under-report small-scale, intra-societal events. This under-reporting is a 
result of most data being derived from such sources as the New York 
Times Index, Kessings Contemporary Archives, and Facts on File, all of 
which tend to concentrate only on major conflict events. The several data 
sets developed in the United States for broad cross-national studies of 
political violence are simply not detailed enough to support careful 
theoretical investigation of the Canadian case. 
Nevertheless, three empirical studies in the literature examining "col-
lective violence" using domestic sources may be relevant. First, Jackson, 
Kelly and Mitchell examined all issues of the Globe and Mail for the period 
from 1965 to 1975 and identified 129 incidents of collective violence in On-
tario. They found that the amount of violence was relatively stable from 
year to year and that demonstrations and incidents relating to foreign 
political questions attracted the largest number of participants.36 
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Second, Frank and Kelly using Canadian sources for the period of 
1963 to 1975 identified some 281 incidents of collective violence in On-
tario and Quebec. The incidence of collective violence was found to be 
relatively similar in the two provinces but the form, intensity and content 
of the violence differed markedly between them.37 
Third, Aunger analyzed news reports of political strife events in 
New Brunswick covering the years 1964-83. According to Aunger, 
political strife includes events such as demonstrations, strikes, riots, 
raids, and bombings. In his most recent study he identifies 58 events and 
concludes that the level of violence in New Brunswick is relatively low. 
The most frequently-occurring events involving violence in New 
Brunswick were demonstrations and riots; bombings only accounted for 
two events.38 
While these studies are limited in their scope, centering around three 
provinces out of a total ten provinces and two territories, and analyze 
different time periods, they have laid the foundation for further inquiry. 
Undoubtedly, the serious investigation of political conflict in Canada is 
hampered by the absence of a comprehensive and detailed national data 
set based on indigenous sources sufficient to develop and test alternative 
theoretical models. Over the nine years since these studies were con-
ducted political violences in Canada has not subsided. Moreover, agen-
cies responsible for Canada's national security are concerned about what 
effect the world-wide increase in terrorism has had on Canada.3' 
Paucity of Rigorous Analysis 
Despite the lack of scholarly attention given to political violence in 
Canada and the inadequate data, there have been a handful of studies on 
terrorism in Canada. While there is a growing literature on terrorism in 
general, there is a paucity of rigorous analyses of terrorism in Canada and 
the majority of the literature is unsystematic in its method of anlaysis. This 
is understandable as there are very few academic treatments of terrorism in 
Canada, the exceptions being a few articles, theses, and dissertations. Con-
sequently, the lion's share of information on terrorism in Canada consists 
of popular periodical coverage from magazines, newspapers, and the like, 
and a handful of government documents. 
Reliances on atheoretical case studies 
The majority of articles, books, dissertations, and governmental 
reports written on political terrorism in Canada consist of case studies of 
various terrorist incidents, case studies of domestic terrorist groups, 
printing of revolutionary literature, and autobiographies of ex-terrorists. 
These case studies rely heavily on descriptive analyses and consequently 
are usually atheoretical and unsystematic in methodology. 
First, the literature is dominated by case studies of various terrorist 
incidents primarily focusing on the October Crisis of 197040 and the Air 
India disaster in 1985.41 Second, case studies of terrorist groups or 
groups using terrorist tactics operating in Canada focus on domestic 
groups and include, in order of frequency, the activities of the FLQ,42 of 
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the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors,43 and of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).44 
Third, manifestos or other revolutionary literature occasionally are 
printed.45 This mainly involves the writings that justify terrorism which 
appear either in book form, in the mainstream news media, or in 
underground newspapers. Fourth, and closely related to the printing of 
revolutionary literature, are autobiographies of ex-terrorists, especially 
those who were members of the FLQ.46 Other than these four categories, 
there has been a lack of empirical analyses of political terrorism in 
Canada. 
Studies that have used more rigorous approaches 
As exceptions to this lack of rigor, one might include a handful of 
academic treatments such as the analysis of some issue with respect to 
one terrorist group, the analyses of one aspect of terrorism as it related to 
the Canadian scene, and quantitative studies analyzing the frequency of 
international terrorism in Canada. First, studies that analyze a particular 
aspect of terrorism include: the analysis of news coverage of Armenian 
terrorism in Canada;47 the governmental response to the FLQ during the 
October Crisis;48 public opinions with regards to October Crisis;49 and 
the impact of transnational factors on separatist terrorism.50 Second, 
miscellaneous topics on terrorism which affect Canada which have been 
analyzed more rigorously include: jurisdictional issues;51 hostage 
negotiations;52 policy and organizational responses;53 and legal 
concerns.54 Studies dealing with one particular issue with respect to one 
particular terrorist group and miscellaneous issues tend to be more 
systematic and comparative in methodology. 
Most studies of terrorism do not present a comprehensive picture of 
the scope, intensity, and range of terrorism occurring in Canada: 'scope' 
includes studies of how widespread political terrorism might be; intensity 
refers to the frequency of occurrence, seriousness, destructiveness and 
political impact of each type of violation at a given time; a range covers 
the variety of tactics, issues, or groups that use domestic political ter-
rorism events. Further, the majority of studies are not empirical. While 
several methodologies exist to examine terrorism empirically at the na-
tional level55 the amount of terrorism occurring in Canada is best found 
through the use of aggregate data or an events data approach. 
There are only two quantitative studies that either analyze terrorism 
affecting Canada as part or all of their study using the events data ap-
proach.56 These studies deserve special attention and will be examined 
under the section dealing with problems with statistics on terrorism in 
Canada. 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
Introduction 
There are several methodologies for empirically analyzing terrorism. 
Four of the most commonly used methods are evaluated as possible ways 
to measure terrorism in Canada: direct observation; content analyses of 
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terrorists' self reports; survey research; and aggregate data analyses. The 
author argues that the aggregate data approach would be the best 
method for understanding the scope, intensity and range of political ter-
rorism in Canada. Studies which analyze statistics on terrorism in 
Canada are also evaluated, including consideration of the difficulties in 
creating a reliable data base. 
Direct Observation 
If one wants to know why terrorist actions are initiated or subside 
one might directly observe the dynamics of a terrorist organization. Par-
ticipant observation permits the investigator to study individuals as they 
actually behave in a real social or political setting. This strategy is similar 
to that used by J. Bowyer Bell in his case studies on terrorist organiza-
tions" or by Gerard Chailand in his work on guerrillas.58 This method, 
however, presents a number of difficulties: lack of comprehensiveness, 
access, mistrust by terrorists, reactivity, a variety of ethical dilemmas, 
and the potential of death or arrest by authorities. 
Content Analyses of Terrorists' Self Reports 
A better method might be content analyses of statements, books or 
articles written by people who have engaged in terrorist actions. Accor-
ding to Manheim and Rich, content analysis is 
the systematic counting, assessing, and interpreting of 
the form and substance of communication. Content 
analysis provides us with a method by which we may 
summarize fairly rigorously certain direct physical 
evidences of the behaviors of, and the relationships bet-
ween various types of political actors." 
Only the communications of those terrorists that have been active in ter-
rorist campaigns should be analyzed. While this research has not been 
done, two studies analyze in whole or in part the written biographies of 
former or active terrorists.60 
This methodological approach also presents a few problems. First, 
not all "important" terrorists have written autobiographies or articles. 
Second, this type of research will necessitate a team of researchers that 
have facility in different languages (for example, French, English, Ger-
man, etc.). Third, autobiographical reports are designed for a purpose 
whether it be description, persuasion, exhortation, direction, self promo-
tion or even obfuscation. Therefore, in analyzing such communications, 
one must attempt to interpret their content in the context of their ap-
parent purpose. 
Survey Research 
Another method possible might be that of interviewing or surveying 
terrorists who are either active or incarcerated. According to Manheim 
and Rich, survey research is 
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a method of data collection in which information is ob-
tained directly from individual persons who are selected 
so as to provide a basis for making inferences about 
some larger population.61 
This information may be obtained by direct questioning through per-
sonal or telephone interviews, or by having the subjects complete 
previously mailed or self-administered questionnaires. A well-designed 
survey can provide five types of information about respondents: facts, 
perceptions, opinions, attitudes and behavioral reports." The best 
method for this study would be personal interviews as other types of 
surveys tend to have a very low response rate. Once again only terrorists 
who have committed a substantial number of actions should be question-
ed. 
The survey method is not without its problems, especially with ac-
cess and reliability. It is very expensive and can produce highly biased 
data because of the features of the interview process itself. Difficulties 
stemming from the mutual suspicion of terrorists and governments are 
inevitable. West German social scientists, for example, found it very dif-
ficult to interview incarcerated members of the Red Army Faction and its 
successors. Most were unwilling to meet with researchers.63 They also 
found somewhat paradoxically that local government authorities were 
reluctant to cooperate even though their study was commissioned by the 
federal Minister of the Interior. The West German effort, however, was 
hampered most because researchers attempted to interview suspected ter-
rorists who were under arrest or undergoing trial but who had not been 
convicted. Knutson, on the other hand, succeeded in interviewing some 
convicted terrorists in American prisons. She found the authorities 
helpful and the prisoners eager for a chance to express themselves to a 
sympathetic listener; most felt that during their trials they had not been 
given an opportunity to explain the reasons for their actions.64 Dif-
ferences both in method and in situation may explain Knutson's relative 
ease of access compared to the difficulties encountered by the West Ger-
mans.65 
Aggregate Data/Events Data Approach 
Aggregate data on terrorist groups and state actions are probably 
the most useful in testing macro-theories about terrorism or conflict 
behavior for that matter.66 It allows us to focus on the terrorist behavior 
itself, using the discrete incident as its unit of analysis, rather than 
statements by observers and practitioners. It is also the most prevalent 
type of data on terrorism. 
The events data approach with respect to Canada has several im-
mediate shortcomings: access to statistical information, lack of statistical 
information on Canada, and problems with that statistical information. 
Statistical Information on Terrorism in Canada 
Statistical information on political terrorism affecting Canada is 
either publicly unavailable, inaccurate, dated, or limited to international 
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or transnational events. Of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the 
Department of National Defence (DND), the national security agencies 
responsible for investigating and combating acts of terrorism, none 
publish either statistics or a chronology of events; neither do 
metropolitan or provincial police forces. 
This finding was the result of a request which was sent out by the 
author to major Canadian newspapers for in-house news indexes, and to 
major metropolitan Canadian police departments, provincial police 
departments, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Securi-
ty Intelligence Service, and the Department of National Defence, all of 
which were asked for available chronologies and data bases on terrorism. 
This procedure yielded very little, if any, information.67 
One might be able to turn to the larger terrorist events data collec-
tions.68 Six publicly available resources of information on terrorism are 
relevant to Canada. First, the Rand Corporation has published a 
chronology of international terrorist incidents encompassing the years 
1968-1974, updated yearly. While the Rand Corporation has a 
chronology and data set on domestic terrorism in the United States, it 
presently does not have one on domestic terrorist incidents in other coun-
tries. 
Second, the Risks International Corporation has a "Terrorism Data 
Base," which is a computer readable file of information on terrorist ac-
tivities in non-communist countries worldwide. The data base is used 
primarily in answering inquiries from corporations about the current 
situation in a region, country, or city and for producing quantified infor-
mation for two of their publications: Executive Risk Assessment and 
Quarterly Risk Assessment. Like the CIA, Risks does not separate Cana-
dian statistics from U.S. statistics but combines them under North 
American totals. A copy of the March 1983 Quarterly Risk Assessment 
reveals much background information on incidents in this report to be 
false, sensationalistic, and/or unconfirmed. Moreover, while Risks 
maintains files since 1970, information has only be coded and placed on 
computer since 1981, and the data are geared for commercial use. Mit-
chell adds that Risks provides only composite figures, and the coding 
scheme used for assessing potential incidents for inclusion is not par-
ticularly rigorous.69 
Third is the International Terrorism—Attributes of Terrorist Events 
(ITERATE) data base originally developed by Edward Mickolus. The 
publicly available version, ITERATE II, indexes terrorist acts from 1968 
to 1979 and is based on reports from more than 200 news services. The 
ITERATE II system contains information on 3329 incidents of transna-
tional terrorism. Each year, a total number of terrorist acts per group is 
determined. Since the amount of terrorism by a group tends to vary over 
time, the total number of terrorist acts per group per year of activity is 
determined and then an average (total number of terrorist acts divided by 
years of operation) is determined.70 
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Several criticisms have been voiced regarding the ITERATE data. 
According to Schmid, the range of incidents labelled as "terrorism" is 
wide. It harbors some categories of incidents which are doubtful, and 
policy considerations may play a bigger role than scientific criteria in in-
cluding or excluding incidents of political protest and violence." 
Fourth, a narrative chronology of ITERATE II was published in 
1980.72 It presents totals of international terrorist events by country, 
committed by external groups and broken down into several categories. 
Summaries of many of the incidents enumerated in the CIA tabulations 
are available in this publication. Unfortunately, this information is dated 
and difficult to interpret. In addition, the chronology of events which 
take place in Canada includes events which upon close examination are 
not terrorist in nature and omits others that are. 
Fifth, there is the CIA published "Tabulations of International In-
cidents" through 1980. The information is based on individual terrorist 
acts which are compiled into a computerized data base, from which 
descriptive statistics are calculated, and long term trends in terrorist cam-
paigns are investigated. Unfortunately, as with Risks data, these tabula-
tions do not separate Canadian statistics from U.S. statistics but com-
bine them together under North American totals. Moreover, the reports 
do not include a chronology of events to permit checks on the accuracy 
of their data collection. 
Sixth, the U.S. State Department's "Office for Combating Ter-
rorism" publishes an annual survey of transnational incidents. This 
survey, which was initiated by the CIA in 1968, was turned over to the 
State Department in the early days of the Reagan administration. Since 
its inception, the CIA/State Department data set has been a highly 
regarded and widely-quoted source of descriptive statistics. Allegations, 
however, have been made that its coding scheme was redesigned in 1981 
in order to suit the foreign policy objectives of the Reagan administra-
tion. The entire data set was then back-dated which resulted in a doubl-
ing of the number of incidents since 1968. Threats and hoaxes were now 
defined as incidents.73 
Statistical Studies Focusing on Canada 
There are three studies which analyze statistical data on terrorism in 
Canada: Mitchell,74 Kellett,75 and Charters.76 Mitchell, for example, ex-
amines the incidence of politically-motivated insurgent terrorism in 
North America from 1968 to 1983 and the resultant policy and organiza-
tion responses of the U.S. and Canadian governments. He notes the lack 
of data on terrorism in Canada but does not actually collect any for his 
study. Instead he relies on data from Rand, CIA and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation sources previously mentioned. 
The most detailed study of terrorism affecting Canada which actual-
ly involves data collection is Kellett (1981). The report focuses specifical-
ly on some trends in international terrorism, emphasizing the period 
1968-1979, and assesses potential developments. It includes a chronology 
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of international terrorist events affecting Canada and concludes that 
Canada has experienced and will probably continue to experience a 
relatively low level of international terrorism. 
This report is a useful beginning but has several drawbacks. First, 
the information is dated; numerous terrorist events have occurred in 
Canada since 1981. Second, events which are not specifically terrorist in 
nature (threats, hoaxes, capture and the like) or are not confirmed as ter-
rorist events are included in the chronology of events. Third and most 
important, the report is limited to only one type of terrorism, that being 
international, whereas—as will be shown below—most terrorist incidents 
in Canada have been domestic. 
Finally, Charters reviews the publicly available information on 
Canada's experience as an espionage and terrorism 'target' since 1945. 
He collects data on international terrorism because he feels it has been 
Canada's "most persistent problem" and domestic terrorism has not.77 
Charters' definition of terrorism is too broad. He has also erred in con-
tending that domestic terrorism is not as persistent as international ter-
rorism. His chronology of international terrorism suffers from most of 
the problems of Kellett's, because it is largely based on Kellett's work 
and newspaper articles retrieved from the InfoGlobe data base. Finally, 
the chronology has a "success" factor for each event. This factor is not 
defined, thus potentially confusing any interpretations that one might 
derive from it. 
While the empirical focus is on international and transnational ter-
rorism most terrorism occurring in Canada is carried out by domestic 
groups aimed at domestic targets.78 
Problems with Chronologies and Events Data Bases on Terrorism 
in General 
There are two major problems with chronologies or events data 
bases on terrorism: sources of data and data base construction. Data 
bases on terrorism are usually derived from media accounts which are 
often hampered by inaccuracies due to journalists' working conditions, 
selective reporting because of editorial limitations or decisions, the in-
vention of news by journalists (for example, the Pulitzer prize winning 
journalist of the Washington Post who invented a story of a ten year old 
boy who was addicted to heroin), and the planting of 'news' by secret 
services on terrorist actions which did not occur.7' 
Moreover, data bases or chronologies in particular suffer from their 
own problems: their definitions of terrorism are sometimes too broad or 
imprecise; the information is dated or limited to a short time span or to 
international or transnational events; country statistics are not separated 
but combined under regional totals; events which are not purely terrorist 
are included;'0 events which have not been confirmed as terrorist inspired 
are included; data collectors seldom have the funds or the means to do a 
thorough job; indigenous sources are not used; chronologies and detailed 
summaries of the events are not provided so that researchers can check 
up on the variety of different types of sources, data bases, chronologies, 
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printed news indexes, and case studies of terrorist organizations, are not 
consulted;81 and a priori policy considerations often biases their 
research, that is, they may be set up to examine the responses to ter-
rorism rather than the causes. 
Coding procedures can also affect the accuracy of the data. 
Specifically, what constitutes a separate event affects one's collection 
and analysis of data. For example, RAND's first chronology'2 viewed a 
wave of forty bombings by one group during one night in the same city as 
one incident, whereas ITERATE logged forty incidents. This can lead to 
unnecessary inflation or overestimation of the amount of terrorism. 
Therefore it is important for the researcher to use such data with these 
limitations and biases in mind. 
Miscellaneous Reasons Why a Data Base Has Not Been Created 
Besides the general lack of scholarly interest in the empirical study 
of political violence in Canada and the inadequate data base previously 
mentioned, one reason why a data base on terrorism in Canada has not 
been created to date is the absence of a news index or data base indexing 
news stories before 1977. A related factor is the cost both in time and 
money in compiling a long-run data base. 
A computer readable data base of Canadian news sources—In-
foGlobe—and an index of Canadian newspapers—Canadian News In-
dex—was created in 1977. Previously, Canadian researchers had to use 
either vertical files produced by libraries or to read through each issue of 
a particular newspaper, either in hard copy or in microform, until they 
found what they wanted. The first method was very unreliable as it 
depends on the selection criteria of librarians who were perhaps not as 
sensitive at selecting articles on terrorist events as were trained resear-
chers/coders. The second method was costly in time and money. The 
news index speeded up searching for articles thus reducing the cost of hir-
ing trained researchers/coders to look through each issue. 
Regardless of whether or not an index is used, this type of research 
takes much time to complete, time to search for appropriate articles, to 
compile an accurate picture of an event, to code the information, and 
then to place it on computer files. All the information for each event is 
rarely located in one source thus making it necessary to consult several 
sources and several issues to gain a composite picture of a single event. 
There are blind alleys: for example, a case study will mention that a 
bomb went off in the latter part of a particular year in a particular city 
without specifying the exact date. This means that the researcher/coder 
has to search the newspapers from this city starting with the last month 
of the year and working backwards until an article is found referring to 
this event. Sometimes, the researcher/coder fails to find an article on this 
event either because one was never printed or because the author of the 
case study made an error. Since all necessary microforms are rarely 
located in the same place, acquisitions of needed microforms can delay 
the coding process. Finally, this medium is visually tiring thus requiring 
that the researcher/coder limit working time with microform readers. 
59 
Spring 1988 
The searching and coding process can be speeded up and the reliability of 
the study increased using several researchers/coders. However, needless 
to say, this only increases the cost of the research. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding article has outlined the conceptual and 
methodological problems of conducting research on political terrorism in 
Canada. Developing a general, sound, and accepted means to measure 
political terrorism entails a monumental amount of work, and still there 
undoubtedly will be measurement flaws which may produce misleading 
conclusions. The awareness of these problems, however, should help in 
constructing a reliable and useful data set on political terrorism in 
Canada. 
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